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The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in Labor Studies. Anyopinionsexpressed are those of the author
and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.Job changes often occur without spells of unemployment. Highly educated
workers, for example, rarely suffer unemployment, even though job changes are
common.Alarge proportion of their job switches occuronlyafter the new job
is secured. These workers, whose skills and ability levels are less homogene—
ous, differ from less skilled, perhaps more homogeneous workers who are more
likely to experience unemployment in the process of changing jobs. Most
research has focused on job changes that imply spells of unemployment.
Indeed, the primary rationale behind the earliest papers on search theory was
to explain unemployment.1 But if there exists what some refer to as a "dual
labor market,"2 these theories may be most applicable to the secondary workers.
This paper attempts to formulate a theory of turnover and wage dynamics that
may better describe the primary labor force, defined as those who change jobs
without unemployment.3 In the process, a number of previously unexamined
phenomena are explored.
The first task is to understand the relationship between worker quality
and turnover. E markets clear more quickly for the most able workers? Why
is it that there is a tendency to try to hire the most able individual, even
though his wage rate is higher? It appears that prices do not adjust fully
for differences in quality. Buyers constantly seek that diamond in the rough.
This also yields a variation on the Peter Principle: The best workers are
stolen away so those who remain appear incompetent relative to their peers.
The process that is examined makes "stigma" an important feature of labor
markets. Because of the information that is produced when workers receive or
fail to receive outside offers, workers who are undesired by outsiders are
treated differently from those who enjoy an active outside market. Thus,
stigma, which can be thought of as the consequences of a worker's history of
offers and/or employment, is modeled and treated explicitly.—2—
Information about worker ability evolves over time. The model provides a
parsimonious description of the process by which a worker's wage convergesto
his marginal product. The patterns of turnover and wage change canbe related
in a very simple way to the difficulty associated with learning aworker's
ability. For example, when information is difficult to acquire, wageshave
little dispersion within an occupation, and stigma is unimportant. Further,
there is only a very weak relation between ability and tenure.Other
relationships are easily traced.
A number of implications are derived. Among the more interesting are:
(1) The best workers are more likely to be raided. Everyone goesafter
high quality, higher—priced ones rather than lower quality,lower—priced ones.
(2) wages of workers who receive outside offers differ from wagesof
those who do not. A corollary is that the importance of stigma depends upon
the probability that an outsider recognizes the ability of a givenfirm's
workers. Stigma is not likely to be as pronounced for assembly lineworkers
as it is for research academicians. As a result, wages convergeless quickly
to true output for assembly line workers than for academicians.
(3) The wage difference between the best paid and worst paidworkers
within an occupation is positively related to that occupation's equilibrium
level of turnover. Turnover is a proxy for market information,which tends to
drive each worker's wage toward his marginal product.
(4) The difference between the wages of those who turn overand those who
do not is negatively related to the equilibrium level of turnoverwithin an
occupation. Low—turnover occupations are likely to havethe most pronounced
differences between the wages of movers and stayers.
(5) The oldest workers on a given job are the least productive.This
paraphrases the Peter Principle4 and results because the most ableof the young
workers are bid away.—3—
(6) Workers who search for jobs during time not worked may actually have
lower wages than those who "loaf" during the unworked time. Failed search
carries worse connotations for the worker's productivity than not searching at
all.
Before any implications are derived, it is necessary to construct a model
and to outline a few basic relations. That is done in the next section.
I. A MODEL
To focus on competition among firms for workers, we begin with a simple
model that captures the key features of the effects of informational differ-
ences and informed trading. This enables us to examine phenomena such as
raids and offer matching in the labor market.
The Basic Set—Up:
Suppose that there are two firms, j and k, and that the worker is
currently signed up to work for firm j. In April,jannounces to the
worker that it will pay him a salary of W, beginning September 1 •After
that announcement is made, firm k may decide to raid. Raiding means that k
makes a counter—offer to the worker that exceeds W. After the counter—offer
is made, jhas the option to up its bid, followed by k's counter, and so
forth until one of the two firms drops out of the bidding. All of this occurs
before September 1.
The worker is worth M at firm j and Mk at firm k. Further,
=M+S
Mk =M—4—
so that M is the worker's general skill and S is specificto the current
firm.5 A negative value of S implies that the worker is better suited to
firm k. Both M and S are random variables. For simplicity,it will be
assumed throughout that they are distributed uniformly: M is uniform on the
interval [0, 11 and S is uniform on the interval [—ct/2, a/2]. Thus, Mj
takes on values from —a/2 to1 +a/2and Mk takes on values from 0 to 1.
As a increases, the match—specific component becomes more important. At one
extreme, with a =0,all skills are general. At the other extreme, assuming
that a <1,there is as much variation in the specific component as In the
general one.
Information about the worker's productivity takes the following form:
With probability P firm j observes 143exactly, i.e., jis "informed."
With probability (1F3), firm j only knows the distribution of 7.5.
Similarly, with probability k' firm k observes TMkexactly. With
probability (1 —k'firm k knows only the distribution of Mk.
In general, one might expect that >p.Still, this does not imply
that k =0.As an example, suppose that to become informed of a worker's
productivity, it is necessary to read one of his papers in the AER.If a
potential employer reads only one of twenty papers per issue, thenthe proba-
bility that any one paper is read is .05. Although the current employeris
more likely to read one of his own workers' papers, so that >p,it is
still possible that an outsider may read one that the current employer over-
looks (for example, when two of his sQorkers have papers in the same issue).
This notwithstanding, unless otherwise noted, it will be assumed that
=k=Pfor notation simplicity. The P can be thought of as an index of
an occupation's "visibility." In some jobs, it is difficult(for insiders and















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































easier. At one extreme is an assembly line worker, whose individual output is
difficult to separate from that of his co—workers. It is also unlikely to be
observed by a potential raider. At the other extreme is an academic
economist, who publishes his ideas and makes his product easily observed to
insiders and outsiders.
The situation is depicted in figure 1 •Itstarts after j has announced
a wage offer of W, to which k must react. Wage W, derived below, is the
optimal offer consistent with zero profits. Firm k is either informed, with
probability P, or uninformed. If k is uninformed, then node 1 is
relevant, where k's best strategy is to pass. A raid at any wage greater
than W has negative expected value, and any raiding offer less than W is
doomed to failure.6
A raiding offer by k at a wage greater than W encounters either an
informed or uninformed j. If j is informed, then j fails to match the
offer only when it exceeds M. But the expectation of Mk, given that
M < Z (for any Z) is
1 min(Z,a/2) M
(1) E(MjM +S<Z) =/2+min(Z,cL/2)-2
z —sdMdS
It can be shown that this is always smaller than W, the initial wage offer
made by j.7 Therefore, no raid by k that can be successful is profitable.
This is a manifestation of "winner's curse." On average, a bid that success-
fully attracts a worker is too high if the bidder is uninformed. A worker who
can be stolen away from an informed employer is a worker that k would rather
do without at the price required to steal him.8 So if j is informed and k
is not it pays for k to pass.
If jis uninformed, then k's offer must be interpreted by j. If j
believes that k only raids when k is informed, then j must calculate the—6—
expected value of M1, given that M > Wk since k would not offer
unless it were less than M:
E(MJ j
M> wk) =E(MJM > wk) + E(S)
=
(Wk+ 1)/2 + 0 > Wk
since Wk < 1and since M and S are independent. Thus, it always pays
for j to match k's offer so k's raid cannot succeed if jis
uninformed. Thus, although k does not know whether jis informed or not,
it does not pay to raid under either situation.
If jassumes that k raids when k is uninformed as well as informed
that M > W, then j's counter—offer will still be high enough to make it
unprofitable for k to raid when uninformed. That is, the equilibrium will
not be rational because jassumes that k raids when uninformed, but it
does not pay for k to do so when j maintains that assumption.
The reason is that k knows that it can win a bidding war against j
only when j is informed that M + S < Wk. (Ifjis uninformed, j
follows k so k cannot outbid j.) Under those circumstances, when k
wins, it receives
E(MI M + S < wk) —Wk
Equation (1) (and footnote 7) imply that this expression is negative. Thus,
it does not pay for k to raid when uninformed so this violates j's initial
assumption.
This somewhat lengthy discussion boils down to the conclusion that k's
optimal strategy is to pass when uninformed. Thus, no raids occur at node 1.
This means that jkeeps the worker at wage W and has an expected rent of
(1/2 —W).—7—
Things are more interesting when k is informed. Under those circum-
stances, raids can take place, but are not automatic. Node 2 is reached when
k is informed. There are two possibilities: k knows that M >W (node
2.1) or k knows that M<W (node 2.2). When M<W, it does not pay for
k to raid because a successful raid would result in losses of W —M.As it
turns out, j's expected rent at this node is negative as well:9
(2) J's Rent at 2.2 =E(M+sJ M< W)—W
=
E(MJM < w)+ E(S) -W
=W/2—W=—W/2
At node 2.1, when k is informed that M > W, it pays to raid. There
is some positive probability that k will attract the worker at a price less
than M. Th see this, recognize that a raiding k encounters either an
informed or uninformed j. If jis uninformed (node 2.1.1),jmust infer
MJ from the fact that k raided. As already noted, j's inference is that
E(MJI H > W) =(w+ 1)/2> w so j matches every offer by Ic.1° Under these
circumstances, j retains the worker, but the expected rent to j from doing
so is exactly zero since k drops out of the bidding only when the wage offer
has reached H.
The reason that k engages in this bidding war is that k does not know
that jis uninformed and when jis informed, k earns profit from the
battle. That occurs at node 2.1 .2. There, jis informed. The only factor
that distinguishes j from k at this point is the specific factor, S. If
S > 0 then j will always end up out—bidding k and will retain the worker.
Since k and j only see Mk and respectively, and not M and S
separately, they do not know the outcome of the bidding until it has actually
occurred. This is shown at node 2.1 .2.1 •Therejretains the worker, but—8-
ends up paying M for him because k drops out of the bidding only when the
wage has gone to M. The expected rent that jreceives at node 2.1.2.1. is
(3) J's rent at 2.1.2.1 =
E(Mj
—
MIM > W, S > 0)
=E(SI M>w),S >0)
=ct/4
IfS < 0, then j will lose the bidding war. This occurs on node
2.1.2.2. Firm j earns no rent (the worker leaves before work takes place),
but firm k earns profit. Firm j drops out of the bidding only when the
wage has reached M ÷ S, or if M +S< W, then j never counters. Firm k
receives M in output from the worker, at wage =Max[W,M +SI.Since M > W
and M > M +S,k earns rents.
It is node 2.1.2.2 that generates k's desire to raid. Although k
does nothing other than raise the worker's wages on nodes 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.1,
k is successful in stealing the worker at 2.1.2.2 and earns profit from doing
so. There, k pays either W or M =M+Swhen S <0for the worker,
but receives M. If W < then j drops out when the wage reachesM.
Thus, k receives —S on each worker. If W > then jdoes not even
respond to k's first offer and k receives M —W.This also shows why it
is important to have some firm—specific output. Firm k wins the worker
when s is negative, If S were always zero, then k would never raid.
Althoughcx may be very small, all that is required is that it remain
positive to make it profitable for k to raid.
Node 2.1.2.2 is special also because it is the only situation in which
turnover occurs. This happens with probability P2(1 —W)/2.Since, as will
be shown below, W is decreasing in P, turnover increases as P rises.
More "visible" occupations have more turnover. A number of related empirical
implications are discussed later.12—9—
Equilibrium and Offer Matching:
The interactions described above yield equilibrium:jassumes that k
raids if and only if k is informed that M > W. Under that assumption,it
pays for k to do just that. An alternative equilibrium,in which j
assumes that k raids when informed that M > W or whenk is uninformed,
is not consistent. Under these circumstances, k prefers not toraid when
uninformed. Other possibilities (k raids only when uninformed or when
informed that M < W) do not yield consistent equilibriaeither.13
One interesting feature of battles between j and k is that k hopes
that j is informed. The reason is that if jis ignorant, j's best
response is to follow k, so that k can never succeedin attracting the
worker. If j is informed, then j allows the worker to leave when S <0.
It is under these circumstances that k makes money. What is also true,of
course, is that the worker ends up being employed efficiently.
Also note that it is rational for j to match offers. The pattern of
offer matching varies, however, with j's information. Ifjis uninformed,
then j takes all cues from the market. It always pays to respond to k. If
j is informed,j only responds to k's offer up to M +S.If S is
negative, this means that the worker receives a wage less than M, even
though a raid has occurred. So the worker prefers that k be informedthat
M >W,but that j be uninformed. Under these circumstances, he receives
M. If both are informed, he receives M when S > 0, but onlythe maximum
of M ÷ S and W when S < 0. This is necessarily less than
Derivation of the Initial Wage Offer:
Firm joperates in a competitive labor market and cannot attract
workers unless it offers the highest wage consistent with zero profits (and
behaves efficiently). This means that W must be set so that j's expected—10—
rent on hiring a worker at W is zero. Of course, this takes into account
that the level of W affects the number of raids that occur and that if a
raid occurs, the worker is paid a wage other than W.
Firm jearnsrent at nodes 1, 2.1.2.1, and negative rent at node 2.2.
Thus, the expected rent is the probability of arriving at those nodes, times
the expected rent at the relevant node. The zero rent condition is given by
(4) Expected Rent =0=(1—P)[1/2 —WI+(1_W)[a/4] +PW[—W/2]
Solving (4) for W yields two roots, one of which is always negative and
attracts no workers. The other is given by
(5) w=j.{cQ2_ 8P+8+/(2_8P 1-8)2_16P4P —4-
Thisrather messyexpressioncan be made intuitive in two ways: First,
notethat
(6) urn W =(/T + P — 1)/P
aO
Althougha cannot be exactly zero (or k never raids), it is instructive to
examine behavior at the limit.
As a becomes zero, the rent associated with node 2.1.2.1 goes to zero
as well. This means that the rent that the firm earns on node 1 must offset
the "winner's curse" effect on node 2.2. consider what happens if P =0.
Under these circumstances, k never raids, so that jisleft with the
entire distribution of workers. The expected value of M +Sfor the entire
population is 1/2 so W =1/2.The limit of the r.h.s. of (6) as P goes to
O is 1/2.If P =1,then a raid occurs any time the worker's wage is below
his marginal product. Since S =0,this means that the firm ends up paying
M for all workers with M > W (or losing them) which yields zero rent. But
it also ends up paying W for all workers with M < W. This is a losing—11—
proposition for any W > 0 so thesolution when P =1is w =0.Substitu-
tion of P =1into (6) yields W =1.
For 0 < P < 1, W is bounded by zeroand 1/2. The intuition is
straightforward. Firm j knows that for any W,it will lose P2(1 —W)/2
to firm k. This is illustrated in figure2 by the shaded area so that j is
left with the unshaded area. It must be the casethat the W is chosen so
that the expectation of M, over the distributionreflected by the unshaded
area (normalized), is equal to W. Alower W means that more workers are
picked off. It is clear that W mustlie below 1/2 in order for the
expectation after having removed the shaded areato equal W. Only if nothing
were removed from the upper portion (i.e.,if P =0),would the expectation
of M among the stayers be 1/2.
Stated in other terms, there are only two reasons that aworker is not
stolen away whenci approaches 0. Either his value to both jand k is
below W so that k opts not to raid, or that M >Wbut k is uninformed.
As P increases, the probability that theworker is unraided merely because
k is uninformed declines, so that workers whoremaintend to be lower
quality. As such, W must fall to compensate.
Whenci is greater than zero, (5) is difficult to interpret,but numeri-
cal solutions are instructive. Table 1 calculatesW for values ofci and
P as given by (5).
The first two columns of table 1 report the valueof W that yields zero
profits, given the corresponding P and
ci.Three points, which are tedious
to show analytically, are obvious from thetable:
First, independent of ci,the equilibrium level of W is .5 when P =
0.Since no raids occur, jis left with the entire distribution of workers,
which has an expected value of output equal to.5.—12—
Table 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Prbabi1itycpectedExpected Expected P W of leaving Wage Wage Gap Wage
LeaversStayers
a .001
0.000 0.500 0.000 0.749 0.500 0.250 0.500 0.100 0.487 0.003 0.743 0.499 0.244 0.500 0.200 0.472 0.011 0.736 0.497 0.238 0.500 0.300 0.456 0.025 0.728 0.494 0.233 0.500 0.400 0.436 0.045 0.718 0.490 0.228 0.500 0.500 0.414 0.073 0.707 0.484 0.223 0.500 0.600 0.387 0.110 0.693 0.476 0.217 0.500 0.700 0.354 0.158 0.677 0.467 0.210 0.500 0.800 0.309 0.221 0.654 0.456 0.198 0.500 0.900 0.240 0.308 0.620 0.447 0.173 0.500 1.000 0.012 0.494 0.506 0.494 0.012 0.500
a—.25
0.000 0.500 0.000 0.691 0.500 0.191 0.500 0.100 0.487 0.003 0.685 0.500 0.185 0.500 0.200 0.473 0.011 0.678 0.498 0.179 0.500 0.300 0.457 0.024 0.670 0.496 0.174 0.500 0.400 0.440 0.045 0.661 0.493 0.168 0.500 0.500 0.421 0.072 0.651 0.488 0.163 0.500 0.600 0.398 0.108 0.640 0.483 0.156 0.500 0.700 0.371 0.154 0.626 0.478 0.149 0.500 0.800 0.338 0.212 0.609 0.471 0.138 0.501 0.900 0.293 0.286 0.587 0.466 0.120 0.501 1.000 0.221 0.390 0.550 0.469 0.081 0.501 a.5
0.000 0.500 0.000 0.640 0.500 0.140 0.500 0.100 0.487 0.003 0.634 0.500 0.134 0.500 0.200 0.474 0.011 0.627 0.500 0.128 0.500 0.300 0.459 0.024 0.619 0.497 0.122 0.500 0.400 0.444 0.045 0.611 0.495 0.115 0.501 0.500 0.427 0.072 0.602 0.493 0.109 0.501 0.600 0.408 0.107 0.592 0.491 0.102 0.501 0.700 0.387 0.150 0.581 0.488 0.094 0.502 0.800 0.363 0.204 0.569 0.486 0.083 0.503 0.900 0.334 0.270 0.554 0.484 0.069 0.503 1.000 0.296 0.352 0.534 0.487 0.047 0.504
a.75
0.000 0.500 0.000 0.597 0.500 0.097 0.500 0.100 0.487 0.003 0.590 0.500 0.091 0.500 0.200 0.474 0.011 0.583 0.500 0.084 0.500 0.300 0.461 0.024 0.576 0.500 0.077 0.501 0.400 0.447 0.044 0.568 0.498 0.070 0.501 0.500 0.433 0.071 0.560 0.498 0.062 0.502 0.600 0.418 0.105 0.552 0.497 0.054 0.503 0.700 0.402 0.146 0.543 0.498 0.046 0.504 0.800 0.386 0.197 0.534 0.500 0.036 0.506 0.900 0.368 0.256 0.525 0.501 0.023 0.507 1.000 0.349 0.325 0.514 0.506 0.008 0.509
0.000 0.500 0.000 0.562 0.500 0.062 0.500 0.100 0.487 0.003 0.555 0.500 0.055 0.500 0.200 0.475 0.011 0.547 0.500 0.047 0.501 0.300 0.463 0.024 0.540 0.500 0.039 0.501 0.400 0.451 0.044 0.532 0.501 0.031 0.503 0.500 0.439 0.070 0.525 0.502 0.023 0.504 0.600 0.427 0.103 0.518 0.504 0.014 0.506 0.700 0.417 0.143 0.512 0.507 0.005 0.508 0.800 0.407 0.190 0.506 0.511 —.005 0.510 0.900 0.398 0.244 0.501 0.516 —.016 0.513 1.000 0.390 0.305 0.496 0.524 —.028 0.516—13—
Second, for all values of a,?A/ < 0. As the probabilitY of being
raided rises, the equilibriumlevel of W falls. There are anumber of
effects. As P rises, the forceof winner's curse (node 2b) increases.This
implies that a lower Wis required to keep profits the samesince rent here
equals —W/2. Also as Prises, the probability that noraid will occur
tails (node 1 is less likely).This also implies that a lower Wis required
to keep profits the same sincerent on this branch is 1/2 —W.Offsetting
this is that the probability of
landing on branch 2.1.2. LS higher,the
higher is P. Firms are morelikely to know about their ownworkers in more
visible occupations. Since rent equals ct/4on this branch, a higher P
implies that the firm must payhigher W to keep profit the same.The first
two effects swamp this one,but the last effect becomes more importantthe
higher is the job—specific component.
This is seen in the table. The value
of w falls more rapidly withP for small values of a thanfor large
values of a. That is,aW/Pa > 0.
Third, as a rises, w risesfor a given P,(P > 0), i.e., /a>
0. This is another manifestationof the last point. As firm—specificcapital
becomes more important, the rent
that j earns when on branch 2.1.2.1
increases. Since the factor marketis competitive, it must redistributethis
rent to the workers and this canonly happen by making a higherinitial wage
offer.
II. Implications and Extensionsof the Model
Turnover:
Recall that turnover occurs only onbranch 2.1.2.2. The outsider mustbe
informed that M > W and the currentfirm must be informed of theworker's
output as well. Furthermore,the rker must be worth more tothe outsider—14—
than to the insider (S <0)or turnover will never occur.
This observation gives rise to a number ofimplications.E'irst, the
probability of turnover is
(7) Prob. of Turnover =P2(1—W)/2
a 2 which, as already mentioned, is increasing in Psince-= P(1—W)—f- -
and i/3P <0.Individuals in more visible occupationsare more likely to
change jobs.
More important, perhaps, is that it is individualsfrom the top of the
distribution who get raided. They are bothmore likely to change jobs and are
also more likely to have their wages raised abovethe initial quote. Because
of imperfect information about workerquality, the initial wage offer tends to
overvalue low quality workers and undervaluehigh quality ones. Outsiders
attempt to pick off only the high quality ones. All firmsknow this when they
hire workers of uncertain quality, and that isthe reason why W is generally
lower than 1/2. But it is still true that thefirst employer ends up with
workers whose average product is below thatof the ex ante distribution.
Raided workers and those who turn over withoutspells of unemployment are
diamonds in the rough.15
It is appropriate for employers torespond to outside offers because
those offers convey information about theworker. Additionally, even when the
current employer has complete information abouta worker, a response up to M.
is appropriate because quasi—rentsare increased by adopting this strategy.16
Since neither P nor a are likelyto he observable, it is useful to
state implications in terms of otherobservable variables. In thiscontext,
the observable variables are W, theinitial offer and wage that unraidec3
workers receive; the wage that workerswho turn over receive; thewage of—15—
the importance
Other Wages and Turnover:
It may seem somewhat counterintuitive
that wages are lower in more
visible occupations. Increases inP imply that there are morecircumstances
where jfinds itself competing with k.Competition among buyers usually
improves the situation ofthe worker. That is true here aswell because there
is a distinction between the average wagethat the worker receives and the
wage that the employers are
willing to pay to workers who donot receive out-
side offers. Although W fallswith P,it is not true that the average
wage falls. Visibility helpssort workers to their most productiveuse.
The worker receives W when noraid occurs. This happens at nodes1 and
2.2. At nodes 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.1,theworker receives Niand stays with j.
stayers (raided andunraided); and the probability of turnoverwithin an
occupation. First, the theory providespredictions on the relationof W to
the probability of turnover.
Recall that the equilibrium wage W dependsonly On a,
of firm specificity, and on P,the visibility of a job. As arises, W
rises for d given P. Also, /4in (7) is negative. This impliesthat if
an increase inci is the reason for a higher W,j's starting wage and the
probability of turnover will benegatively correlated. Further, asP falls,
W rises. An increase in Wand decrease in P both imply lessturnover
through (7). Thus, if P is the causeof the change in W, W and turnover
will be negatively correlated.
The conclusion then is that independentof the source of variations in
W, the probability of turnoverand the initial wage that j offers(and that
unraided workers receive) are negativelyrelated across occupations. This
provides an empiricallytestable and novel prediction aboutthe relation of
turnover to the level of wageswithin an occupation.—16—
Atnode 2.1.2.2, the worker leaves and receives W if W > M + S(jdoes
not respond to k's first offer) and M + S(S < 0) if W < M+ S(j
continuesto match until k outhids him). Thus, thewage that one observes
inan occupationis made up of thewageof leavers and stayers. Since stayers
comefrom two groups (those who are raided and stay and thosewho are never
raided), their average wage is given by
W(1—P÷pw) + E(Mlrajded & stay) [P(1—P/2)(i—w)] E(wage stay) =
(1—P+Pw)+ P(1—P/2)(1—w)
or
(8) t)— w(1-p÷pw)+ (1/2+W/2)p(1—p/2)(1—W) E(wage s ay —
(1—p+pw)+ P(1—P/2)(1....w)
The expected wage for leavers is a convex combination ofthose who leave
at wage W and those who leave after a battlebetween j and k, at wage
M + S. This is somewhat messy to derive and isrelegated to the appendix. it
isgiven by
(9) E(wage1eave) =q+ (1 —O)(1/2+ W/2 —a/8)
where 0 is defined as the probability thata leaver left at wage W rather




The expected wages for leavers and stayersare given in columns 3 and 4
of table 1. Leavers' wages declinemoriotonically in P, but stayers' wages
do riot. Stayers' wages are either W or M. The fallof W with increased
P is offset by the higher probability ofreceiving M rather than W as P
rises. Leavers' wages fall in P because a higher Pimplies a lower W.
Lower Wmeans that a lower average quality worker is susceptible to raidas—17—
P increaSes (i.e., M > W is anecessary condition for raiding).
The difference between the wagesof leavers and that of stayers is
reported in the sixth column oftable 1. It is generalLy positive, implying
thatleavers dobetter than theaverage stayer. Recall thatleavers receive
the minimum of M +Sarid W, given that S <0.Stayers get either W or
M. As (ZgetsLarge so that S becomesimportant,stayers can actually do
better than leavers. This is becausestayers who remain after a rajdfind
theirwages hid uptoM, whereas leaverS getM +SwhenS< 0.If S is
important,jdoes not bid very hard aqainstk so theworker changes jobs
ata relatively low wage.
The difference between theleavers' and stayers' wages decreasesinP.
As P increaseS, workers are morelikely to get M or M +Srather than
w.It is this point that liesbehind the standard intuition. Higher
visibility increases the probabilitYof a battLe. Battles imply that workers
getsomethingnearer to marginal product.This implies that the difference
betweenthe average wage of movers and stayersdeclines with turnover in the
occupation.Since turnover is directly relatedto P (see eq. (7)), high
turnoveroccupations are those associatedwith small gaps.But it also
impliesthat the average wage ch4Jassociated with a job switch is
increasing in P. The wage changeis measured not by the difference between
the average wage of leavers and stayers,but by the difference between the
average wage of leaversand W. That value is increasing in P.
The study of the difference between wagesof movers and stayers is of
great empirical interest (see,for example, early papers by Beckmanand Willis
(1977), Bartel (1980), Bartel andBorjas(1981), and Borjas and Rosen (1980)).
This model provides a theory behind theseempirical relationships.—18—
Iritra—firinWage Dispersion and Stigma:
As P increases, the difference between thewage of unraided and wages
of raided workers who remain with the firm rises.Recall that workers who are
raided necessarily have M >W.Also recall that those workers who remain
after a raid are paid M (nodes 2.1.2.1 and 2.1.1).Now,
E(MI M > W and S> 0) =E(MIM >
becauseM and Sareindependent.This implies that theexpected wage at
both nodes are the same and equal to(1 +W)/2.Thus, the gap between the
expected wage paid to those who remain, hut are raided and thosewho are not
raided is
(10) Internal wage gap(1 +W)/2 —W1/2 —W/2
Differentiating (10) with respect to P yields
/aP=—1/2(/aP)0
Thus,the difference between the way that raided andunraided workers are
treated dependspositively on the visibility of the occupation.
Thisproposition has obvious intuitive appeal. If P is smallthen
little can he inferred from the fact that a workerwas not raided. 1-fowever,
if P is large, jcanbe certain that the reason that no raidoccurred is
that M < W. Recall that there are two reasonswhy a raid does not Occur: The
worker may have M > W, but the outside firm hasnot discovered this; the
worker is an undiscovered star. Alternatively, theworker has M < W so that
he is already overpaid and is not susceptibleto raid. As P rises so that
his output becomes more visible, the likelihood ofbeing an undiscovered star
declines, so that wages of those left unraided must decline.Therefore,
workers in visible jobs who do not receive outside offersare worse oft than
those without outside offers in less visiblejobs.-19—
This is what is meant by "stigma."
Failing to receive an offer carries a
message, even if it is inappropriatefor any given worker. There areworkers
who are simply unlucky; they haveM > W, but fail to receive outsideoffers
by chance. Still, they are lumped
with others who do not receive offersand a
negative inference is drawn abouttheir productivity levels.
Stigma should be worse foracademic economists than for assemblyline
workers. Since academic economists publishtheir work, output is quite
visible to outsiders as well as insiders;P is high. Thus, not receiving an
offer carries significant information.
However, the fact that an assembly
line worker at GM is not raided byFord does not reveal a great deal about
that worker's productivitY. It
would be difficult for Ford to observethat
M > W, even if it were.
This provides a direct implicationfor the relation of intra—firm wage
dispersion to turnover in an occupation.Since turnover varies directly with
P, higher turnover occupations arealso those where the treatmentaccorded
raided workers differs most dramaticallyfrom that given to unraided workers.
If turnover among research professors
is higher than turnover among non—
researchers, intra—firm wage dispersions
should be greater in the research
institutions. This is an easily testedproposition.
What is also true, is that the wageof a worker in a more visible occupa-
tion is a better measure of his product
than the wage of a worker in a less
visible one. Since raids assist inmoving wages away from W andtoward M,
higher turnover occupations also
have compensation that is more closelygeared
to productlvity.
Further, wage dispersion among
raided workers who remain with thefirm
increases as P and the level of turnoverrise. Since /P 0, more
turnover implies more workers aresusceptible to beinq raided. Thevariance—20—
of M among raided workers necessarily rises. Afteran unsuccessful, raid,
workers receive M (as opposed to W or M +5).Therefore, the variance in
wages among raided workers who remain rises with occupational turnover rates.
A similar argument. holds for raided workers who leave. Anincrease in P
implies that W falls. Those who Leave either receive Wor M +S(S K0).
The last paragraph implies that increases in P increase thevariance in
M +Ssince S is independent of M. Additionally, since Wdeclines in
P, and since the wage of raided workers always equals or exceedsw, a
reduction in W adds variance. Finally, since theproportion of job
switchers who receives the constant W is given by 0, andsince 0
increases in W, an increase in P which reduces Wimplies fewer job
switchers with W. Thus, the variance inwages among leavers increases with
the level of occupational turnover. All of thesepredictions are empirically
testable as well.
Raiders' Profits:
The model, as it stands, carries the implication thatthe raiding firm,
k, has positive expected profits, whereas the initialfirm, j,doesnot.
This is a direct result of awarding k anexogenous P that is greater than
zero. Since k can raid selectively, and since it sometimes hasinformation
that the worker is underpaid, it owns a specializedfactor. When k is
informed and when S < 0, profits are made. Theprofit that k receives is
the rent to that specialized factor that places k inthe right place at the
right time. Competition does not imply that rents tospecialized factors must
be dissipated.
On the other hand, since the new—hire market iscompetitive,j must
compete with other firms, including k, that are ex ante identical.Even
though at the time that the worker is hired, M is not known, thepossibility1
Figure 2—21—
that it will be learned forces alli—type firms to push up W Untilexpected
profit is zero.
Raiders' profits would also be zero ifwe allowed that there were a cost
to acquiring P. Suppose that therewere a number of potential k firms who
were competing for the right to know a worker'soutput with probability P.
The price of that information would bedriven up to the point where k's
expected profits were zero as well. The rentwould revert to another factor
of production. For example, if theinformation were acquired byreading the
AER, then the Review's price would rise untilk's expected profits were
zero. This trivial change prevents all firmsfrom wanting to enter the
raiding business, rather than the new—hirebusiness.
Productivity and Job—Tenure:
The Peter Principle says that workerskeep getting promoted until they
can no longer handle the job. Statedalternatively, the newest workers in a
job have a higher probability of beingpromoted out of that job than the older
ones. The fact that a worker has been ina job for a long time means that he
has not been raided successfully in thepast. That failure reflects one of
Lhree things: 1. The worker wasraided, but S > 0 so that the worker
remained at the job. 2. M > W butno outsider discovered it.3. M ( W so
a raid was not profitable.
Pure job matching predicts the opposite ofthe Peter Principle since it
implies that over time, workers (Jet sorted to theirmost productive job.
Thus, individuals with higher levels of tenurein the job are likely to be a
better match than those with low tenure.As such, the older workers in the
job should have higher productivity. This isthe effect of point #1 in the
last paragraph. Obviously, the importanceof the matching effect depends on
u For reasonable values of
cz,thestigma effect (point #3 above) dominates—22—
so that the Peter principleholds. The proof follows:
The probabilitY that the workerremains is
1 —Prob(beiflgat node 2.1.2.2),
or1 —P2(1—W)/2.Thus the expected output of workerswho remain is:
E(M+SI remain at j) =
- }j-i-+(PW)+P(1_P)(1_W)(!+ + ++ -)
[1—(1—W ) / 2]node1node 2.2 node 2.1.1 node 2.1.2.1
or
(12) E(M +I remainat 42+2W2p2÷p2a_2p2
4(2 +WP—P
In order to have outputof older workers exceed that of newworkers it is
necessary that E(M +S(remain at j) > 1/2 since E(M ÷S) 1/2. This
requires that
4 —WPcI+2W2P2+ — 2P2> 2(2 +wp2—
orthat
c > 2W
For low values of c'.,this condition is violated for allP (see table 1,
a< .5), so that older workershave lower expected productivitythan 1/2.
The Peter principle holds. As Xgetslarger, the sorting effectbecomes
more important. Asgoes to 1, it is guaranteedthatct > 2W since W < 1/2
This demonstrates that the relationof job tenure to worker productivitY
depends on the importance of
job—specific skilLs. As thesediminish, the
Peter principle is more likely tobe observed. The existing empirical
evidence, to the extent that it canbe believed, supports the dominanceof the
Peter principle over job_matchingeffects.18—23—
To extend the concept to within—firm promotion, it isnecessary to think
of j and k as departments within a firm. Thischanges things somewhat
because one expects cooperation between departments toa greater extent than
between firms. But as long as some rivalry exists,say due to the failure to
solve all agency problems perfectly, the analysis still holds.19
Search and kiemployment:
The implications of this model differ from those ofsearch theory in an
important respect. The stigma effect discussed above relatesto the negative
information that firms obtain from the failure to beraided. A simple rein-
terpretation of the model provides implications for the relation ofunemploy-
ment to wages.
Stigma may refer to workers who suffer spells ofunemployment and find
that subsequent demand for their services is adverselyaffected. Indeed, there
is a significant literature that attempts toanalyze these spells and to
determine whether they are the result of inherent workerheterogeneity or of
the signalling effect of unemployment.20
This paper focuses on job changes withoutunemployment. However, if the
current firm,j,is reinterpreted as the state of unemployment andW is
defined as the reservation wage, then the model applies tounemployed workers
as well. As the worker is "unraided" out of unemployment, theworker's
expectations about his opportunities change. He updates W basedon the bad
news. Individuals who leave the state of unemployment quickly have the
highest expected wages since the expected wage of leaversgenerally exceeds
1/2. Those who are unemployed for longer periods have lowerexpected wages
because they are, on average, lower ability workers and theirreservation
wages are lower on average.—24—
There are two interesting
interpretations of P inthis context. Since
P measures the probabilitythat an outside firm findsthe worker, p is
higher for non—workingindividuals who are activelyseeking work than for
those who are not. The higheris P, the lower is theexpected output at
firm k of the unraided
worker.21 This means that when Pis high, the force
of stigma is large and whenP is low it is small.If P is higher for
individuals who are actively seekingwork, then those who donot find jobs
should have lower wages when they
eventually do find work thanthose who are
not looking for work. Theintuition is clear: If a workeris looking hard for
a job and fails to find one,then much can be inferredabout his productivitY
from the failure. However,if the individual is not lookingfor a job, not
much can be inferred from thefact that he did not find one.
This implies that for a giventime out of work, those who aresearching
actively should have lower wageswhen they find a job than thosenot
searching. This is the oppositeof the search theory implication.If search
is costly, then in equilibriumworkers who search must expectto receive a
higher wage when theyfind a job than those who donot search. In Lazear
(1974), it was found that timenot worked spent searchingfor a job was more
detrimental to subsequent wage growth
than time not worked wheresearch did
not occur. This argues forthe importance of stigma;worker heterogeneity,
reflected by the time spent findinga job, dominates searcheffects. Failed
search is worse than loafing.
similar point relates to thebusiness cycle. The probabilityof being
discovered, P, is higher duringexpansions than duringcontractions. In a
recession, when firms are not asactively searching for workers,P is low.
This implies that individualswho are unemployed during arecession should
suffer less detrimental effectsto their subsequent wagethan those who are—25—
unemployed during expansions. Intuitively, there is not much stigma
associated with being unemployed during a recession because few firmsare
looking for workers. But if the worker cannot find a job during anexpansion,
then he is more likely to be a bad apple. The effect ofunemployment on
subsequent wages can be estimated and it is straightforward to test whether
this varies with business cycle conditions.
III. Summary and Conclusion
Since a significant fraction of job changesoccur without intervening
spells of unemployment, it is important that the theory ofjob turnover and
wage dynamics incorporate this feature. It implies that only certaintypes of
workers, namely those who are currently underpaid, are raidedby outsiders.
Thus, raids and turnover are selective. All firmsrecognize this fact and
wages adjust accordingly. Worker heterogeneity is at the heart of the
analysis; job changers are different from those who remain withtheir firm.
On average, leavers have higher levels of generalproductivity than stayers,
although stayers who have been raided (unsuccessfully) in thepast have the
highest average productivity specific to the current firm.
The theory gives rise to a number of specificimplications regarding the
relation of wage levels and changes to job changes.Turnover, which proxies
market information in equilibrium, moves a worker'swage toward marginal
product. The analysis has attempted to provide a generaltheory of
occupational wage dispersion. Additionally, the theory implies:
1. Raids are selective. The best workers are more likely toreceive
outside offers. This means that the initialwage does not fully adjust for
quality.—26—
2. It is rational for firms to treatworkers with outside offers
differently from those without themsince the offer carries information about
the relation of productivity to current wage.
3. The oldest workers on the job arethe least productive. This Peter
principle result is the opposite ofthat suggested by a theory of job
matching.
4• searching may be worse than loafingsince failed search carries a
negative signal that is not associatedwith loafing.
The last two implications, which areat variance with two theories that
are standard in the turnover literature,find some empirical support.—27—
Footnotes
*Helpful comments wereprovided by Dennis Canton, Devid Card, Richard
Freeman, Merton Miller, Melvin Reder, JohnRiley, Sherwin Rosen, and Robert
Topel. This paper is a substantially revisedversion of "Raids and Imita-
tion," NEER Working Paper No. 1158. The revisionWS influenced significantly
by referee comments, which are gratefullyacknowledged. This work was
supported by the Department of Labor. Work on theearlier paper was supported
by the National Science Foundation.
1See Phelps (1970), for a collectionof these early papers.
2See Deringer and Piore(1981), Thurow (1972),
3The most notable model ofwage determination is Becker (1975). Others
include tazear (1979), Lazear and Rosen(1981), and Harris and Holmstrom
(1980). The model that most effectively deals withjob turnover in the
absence of unemployment is Jovanovic (1979).Although the theory of specific
human capital attempts to integratewage dynamics with labor turnover, too
much indeterminacy remains to have avery informative set of predictions.
This is rectified somewhat by the work ofKuratanj (1973), Hashimoto (1979),
Hashimoto and Yu (1980) and Hall and Lazear (1982).
4See Peter (1969).
5rhe Scomponent is in the spirit of Jovanovjc (1979).
6Thjs depends in part on j's beliefsabout what k does. In this
section it is assumed that jassumes that k only raids when k is
informed. Below, it will be shown that that isan equilibrium assumption and
that others can be ruled out.
7For Z >
E(MIM+ S < z)— zz(—2+ a)/2 < 0 since < 1. For
Z <—28—
E(MIM +S < Z) — Z=1/16[4Z(4)+4Z2 + c1
Aswill be shown below, J'Sstartingoffer
8P +8




sono Z >Wcan result in positive profitsto the raider.
8See, for example, Wilson (1977), Milgrom
and Weber (1982), and Rileyand
SamuelSon (1981) for a more completediscussion.
90f course, an informed j could sever
all workers with H < W. If
workers and firms are riskneutral, it does not matter becauseW will adjust
to take into account that jis left with some poor workers.The slightest
risk aversion on the worker's part
implies that it is better tooffer all
workers who are not raidedW and to avoid terminations.
10Recall that M and S are independentand S has mean zero so
E(M) —wage=E(M)+0 -wage=M—M=0.
The ideais that a firm can at best assessthe worker's value to
itself. It is rare that thefirm can determine the partof that value that is
general as opposed to
firm—specific. Under these conditions,k and j bid
against one another and onlythe fact that jis willing to continue to raise
after k has stopped revealsthat S > 0.
ignores the kind of bargainingproblem between worker andfirm
that r4ortensefl (1978) discusseS.
RubinStein (1982) solves that problemwhen
the value of the good is knownto both parties, but the essenceof the problem
here is that even if the workerknows M, there is uncertaintyas to whether—29—
the firm knows M. Recall thatthe firm is only informed Pof the time so
(1 —P)of the timeonlyknows the distribution andW is the optimum under
these circumstances. Thismeans that 1p of the time, a worker who
demands a wage greater thanW will be let go. For most
reasonable values of
P (likely to be small), it isoptimal for the worker merely toaccept w.
There are two caveats: First, if
the worker costlessly andimmediately can
obtain another job thatpays w, then all workers with M>Wtry to bar-
gain. Second, if the demandby the worker conveys the
appropriate information
to the firm about M, it
may pay to bargain even if the firm isuninformed
(see the discussion by
Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) on theeffects of adding a
period to a game). Note also thatthe higher is M, themore the worker has
to gain so the more likely isthe worker to demand awage greater than w.
131t might seem thatan informed j would behavedifferently with
respect to high_ability workers thanwith respect to low—abilityones. This
is not correct. The informedj could make W a function ofM. But
nothing is gained for workers withM >W.No W(M) <Macts as a deterrent
to an informed k. No W(M)> M is necessary if k isinformed and no
uninformed k raids.Nothing is gained by conditioningw on M, even
when j has the informationto do so.
Further, risk—neutral workers whodo not know their abilitieswill not
sign with any firm that retainsthe right to reducewagesafter observing M.
This would result in anexpected wage for unraided workersthat is less than
W and since w to unraided
workers guarantees zeroprofit, a fixed W to
all unrajded workers dominates.A fixed W is also lesssusceptible to moral
hazard where the firmattempts to deceive the worker intobelieving that M
is small.—30—
l4See GrosSfllafl (1976), Grossman
and StiglitZ (1976, 1980),Canton
(1982), and Gould andrrecchia (1983) for examplesof drawing inferences
from observable marketvariables.
15This result is in some respectsthe opposite of thatobtained by
GreenWald (1978). GreenWald,whofirstextended Akerlov (1970) toexamine the
possibilitY of winner'scurse in the labor market,
provides a model thatis a
better description ofturnover with unemployment.
It differs from the current
model primarilY in two respects.
First, workers leavetheir jobs when they obtain
sufficiently low draws
of S and enter the state
of unemployment. It is truehere as well that
workers with low S's arethe ones more likely to change
jobs, but that does
not happen with unemployment.
As such, the bidding warbetween j and k
provides some differentimplications about wage changes.Since the purpose of
this paper is to examine jobchanges that occur withoutunemployment, the
Greenwald set—up is not directlyapplicable.
Second, this model placesemphasis on the precisionof the estimate of
worker's output as well asthe mean. This takes theform of informed vs.
uninformed firms. This, too,
is important because it impliesselective
raiding strategies. outsiders
do not buy unless they arequite certain about
what they are getting because
they understand that theyare subject to
winner's curse.
16This ignores any changes in the probabilitY
of a raid that resultsfrom
offer matching. Hall andLazear (1984) examinewhen offer matching encourages
inefficient job search.
17See the pioneering work by Reder (1955)for an early attempt toexplain
differences in wages acrossoccupations.
18See Medoff and Abraham (1980).—31—
19Abraham and Medoff (1983) finda negative simple correlation between
time on the current job and the probability ofpromotion out of it, This is
consistent with this model where most of thehigh ability workers are stolen
away or promoted out early and those who remain are oflower ability.
2OSee, for example, Eliwood (1982); alsoClark and Summers (1982) and
Flinn and Heckmari (1983).
21The expectedoutput of unraided workers is
(1—P)(1/2) +PW(W/2) E(M unraided) =
1-+pw
A sufficient (but not necessary) conditionfor its derivative with respect to
P to be negative is that a< 1.—32--
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THE EXPECTED WAGE OF LEAVERS
For the worker to leave j for
S < 0. The shaded area in figureA.1
equation M +S=W.If M +S< W,
first offer so the wage that the
of (M, S) is in triangle BCD.
that the worker receives M =M
Given that the worker turns
is
k, it is necessary that M > Wand
is the relevant region. Line ABhas the
then j does not even respond tok's
worker receives is W when therealization
If H +S> W, then the bidding war ensures
+S(S < 0). This occurs in trapezoidBCEF.







Theprobability that he turns over atH ÷ S is1 —0.Therefore, the





Note, for example, that if =0,P =0,then W =1/2so 9 =0and
Expected Wage =3/4.Raiders raid only those with M > 1/2and pick them up
at wage M (since S =0).Thus, they get the mean of thedistribution on
H, conditional on M > 1/2,which equals 3/4.Figure A.].
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